We combine survey data of British and German immigrants in the US with data of natives in the UK and Germany to estimate the causal eect of migration on educational mobility through cross-national marriage. To control for selective mating, we instrument educational attainment using government spending on education in the years each person was of school-age. To control for selective migration, we instrument the migration decision using inows of immigrants to the US during puberty and early adulthood. In line with cross-country dierences in the availability of educated spouses, and migrant-native dierentials in the timing of marriage and nancial maturity, we nd that migration causes the likelihood of marrying-up to increase for women and to decrease for men. However, the way migrants self-select into migration and marriage dampens down these eects.
Introduction
Why people decide to migrate and marry and how these decisions aect their socio-economic status have important implications in both the home and host countries; e.g., implications about income inequality, female labor supply, the number of births and population growth, and the distribution of family resources. The extensive economics literature that studies marriage and migration emphasizes that both decisions involve high degrees of selectivity and, depending on this selectivity, they may have diverse eects on the decision-makers. An important drawback of this literature is that it examines marriage and migration independently, it does not account for the interplay between the two and, therefore, it fails to accurately identify their eect on socio-economic mobility. To contribute evidence on this issue, we ask whether a migrant is more likely to marry a spouse of higher education than he would have if he had not migrated.
Migration research in economics treats the decision to migrate as an investment that depends on earnings dierentials across countries net of migration costs (Sjaastad 1962) . By comparing emigrants to non-migrants in the home country pre-migration, researchers have shown that this decision process produces migrants with select skills and characteristics ( ). In combination with the causal eects of migration, this selectivity entails dierential socio-economic trajectories for migrants relative to the population in both the origin and destination countries. Empirical studies, however, rarely compare the post-migration outcomes of migrants with those of non-migrants who never left the home country (e.g. Abramitzky, Boustan, and Eriksson 2012). Most studies compare outcomes of migrants to outcomes of the native-born individuals or other co-ethnics living in the host country, and test the extent to which migrants integrate into the host society or whether children of migrants are more or less upwardly mobile than children of natives. Much of this research relies on US data (Borjas 1993 , 1995 , 2002 , Card 2005 , although more recent studies have also used data from Europe (Dustman, Glitz, and Vogel 2010, Dustman and Theodoropoulos 2010) and Canada (Aydemir, Chen, and Corak 2009 ). Depending on the nature of migrant selectivity, these studies estimate mixed eects of migration on migrants' economic status.
Marriage research in economics originates from the work of Becker (1974) , who predicted that individuals can gain higher social or economic status through marital sorting, depending on whether mobility is measured on the basis of characteristics that are complements or substitutes in household production. For example, Becker argues that women are more likely to marry-up in terms of wages relative to men because men tend to specialize in market production and select to marry women who specialize in home production (negative assortative mating). In contrast, marital mobility in terms of education is uncertain, since education encompasses characteristics that are both complements and substitutes in household production. In his extension of Becker's model, Lam (1988) argues that assortative mating with respect to wages depends on two dierent osetting forces. On the one hand, there is a need for specialization in household production which generates a tendency for negative assortative mating. On the other hand, there is a need for joint consumption of household public goods which generates a tendency for positive assortative mating because there are returns to spouses having similar demands for public goods. Empirical studies generally nd positive assortative mating on the basis of education but, consistent with Lam's prediction, there is mixed empirical support for the hypothesis of negative assortative mating on the basis of wages (Zimmer 1996; Nakosteen and Zimmer 2001 ; Zang and Liu 2003; Nakosteen, Westerlund, and Zimmer 2004) . Irrespective of its direction, assortative mating is important not only because it determines the economic mobility of the spouses but also because its eect extends to their ospring (Chadwick and Solon 2002; Ermisch et al. 2006 ).
Although the economics migration and marriage literatures have largely overlooked the possibility that individuals may take the decisions to migrate and marry jointly, other social science disciplines have long recognized that these two behaviors might be linked. The idea is that a person may migrate because it puts him in a marriage market with a bigger supply of`good' potential spouses, or he may choose a spouse because it is easier or less costly to migrate if he is married to her. A set of sociological studies observe that women from developing countries often migrate in order to marry men living in richer countries (Constable 2004; Kim 2009 ), including compatriot men who had previously migrated abroad (Lievens 1999) . Other studies examine whether migrants marry natives after they arrive to assimilate more rapidly in the culture and society of their host country (Qian and Lichter 1991; Sassler 2005 ). Finally, a dierent set of studies discuss whether people, especially women, marry a foreigner while still in their home country to make it easier to move to another country -either because that country oers better labor market opportunities or because it oers other benets such as better human rights (Watts 1983; Ortiz 1996; Piper 1999) . Albeit insightful, the evidence that this literature produces are merely suggestive, as they are either based solely on qualitative or descriptive data or they are based on statistical analysis that completely sidesteps self-selection into migration.
To our knowledge, Celikaksoy et al. (2006) is the only study in economics that examines the choice of spouse among migrants. Their evidence suggests that immigrants assort positively on education, even when they restrict the sample to immigrants who`import' their spouses from their country of origin. However, this study shares many of the methodological shortcomings of the sociological literature. Because Celikaksoy et al. do not account for immigrant selectivity, they cannot identify the separate eects of the decisions to marry and migrate. Because they use data on each partner's education that were collected after marriage, their evidence ignores the possibility that a couple may have rst married and then completed their education, which could cause spousal education levels to converge even if they were uncorrelated before marriage. Such behavior might plausibly occur if having a partner makes it easier to nance education or if a partner shares information about educational opportunities. Finally, because the study only uses data from the country to which people moved, its evidence sheds no light on what is arguably the most interesting counterfactual question -whether and to what degree marital sorting would dier had immigrants never left their home country.
In this paper, we aim to identify the causal eect of migration on marital mobility in terms of educational attainment. To do this, we combine survey data from Germany and the UK with survey data on German and British immigrants from the US. We use these data to compare educational mobility through marriage among couples of natives living in the UK and Germany and couples living in the US where one partner is a British or German immigrant and the other partner is a US native. We estimate the probability that a migrant marries someone with more education, correcting for both migration and spouse selectivity. To purge the eect of marital sorting, we instrument for attained education using temporal variation in governments spending on total education during the years each person was of school-age. By doing this, we avoid counting as marital mobility any correlation between the education of partners that arises because of how people select a spouse or the correlation that is the consequence of post-marriage educational attainment. To purge the eect of selective migration, we instrument the migration decision using variation in the number of British and German citizens who migrated to the US during the years each person was in puberty and early adulthood. These migrant inows serve as a proxy for the extent of migration networks available to people who are deciding whether or not to move. Our identifying assumption is that higher migration ows lower the cost of migration but do not aect the probability of marrying a more educated US native.
Our data show that observed marital mobility on the basis of education is roughly the same between British migrants and non-migrants, and it is somewhat higher for German migrants relative to non-migrants. However, when we control for marital and migration selectivity, mobility is lower for immigrant men than non-migrant men, and it is higher for migrant women than nonmigrant women, irrespective of the country of immigrant origin. Our analysis suggests that these patterns arise because selectivity diers by sex, migration status, and country of origin.
First, we nd that unobserved characteristics related to marital appeal favor migrant men and disfavor migrant women relative to their non-migrant counterparts. These results are consistent with Becker's prediction that men specialize in market production and women specialize in home production, if market production is country-neutral and home production is country-specic (e.g. acculturating the children to country-specic values). Second, we nd that unobserved characteristics related to the migration decision decrease the probability of marrying up for migrants relative to their non-migrant counterparts. This result suggests that migrants exchange the education of their US spouses for other favorable provisions, e.g. they may select to marrydown as a entry-strategy to the US. Finally, the causal eect of migration on mobility is consistent with the higher availability of educated spouses in the US than in the UK and Germany, and with the fact that British and German men marry and likely reach nancial maturity later in life relative to US natives. The paper is structured as follows: section 2 presents the data and some descriptive statistics, section 3 discusses the empirical strategy, and section 4 presents and discusses the results. A nal section concludes the paper.
The Data
We draw data from the monthly Current Population Surveys (CPS) 1994-2010, from the 1994-2008 waves of the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS), and from the 1994-2009 waves of the German Socio-Economic Panel Study (SOEP). Since 1994 the CPS asks all respondents where they were born and when they arrived in the US. We pool data from all monthly CPS surveys and keep records for couples of rst-generation immigrants and US natives. We combine the CPS data with comparable data from all BHPS and SOEP couples who are both native-born.
We draw data on respondents' level of education, socioeconomic characteristics (age, sex, race), and the relationship between household members. We use the latter data to match husbands and wives.
We exclude from our sample anyone who migrated before age 18 to reduce the chance that a person migrated not because he chose to do so but because his parents chose to migrate. We also exclude individuals surveyed when they were 21 or younger because our primary focus is on educational mobility and we want to reduce the probability that a person has not completed his educational attainment.
It is important to note that the CPS data do not include information on when couples married.
Consequently, we cannot dierentiate between immigrants who married before they came to the US and immigrants who married after they arrived. However, because we know where each partner was born and where each partner's parents were born, we can split our immigrant sample by whether or not an immigrant married a US native (i.e. a US-born individual whose parents were also born in the US or in a country other than the home country of the immigrant spouse), a (rst-or second-generation) compatriot immigrant, or an immigrant from a dierent country. We limit our sample to the rst type of immigrant couples for two reasons. First, separate analysis of the three groups is hindered by small sample sizes. 1 Second, some fraction of couples of the latter two types, likely a non trivial fraction, took their migration decisions as a couple rather than as individuals, especially when they married each other before they migrated.
This requires a complex model of the migration decision which would allow the migration of immigrant husbands and wives to be simultaneously determined. Although it is also possible for British and German migrants to have married US natives before they arrived in the US, we assume that this possibility is relatively low. Table 1 describes the demographic characteristics of couples by sex and migration status and reports sample sizes. The data show that husbands and wives are similarly distributed among educational categories, hinting the potential for marital sorting. The data also show that migrants and their American spouses are generally more educated than natives still living in the home country, suggesting a degree of migrant selectivity in terms of education.
As we mentioned above, to correct our measure of educational mobility for marital selectivity we rely on variation in public spending in education during the years each person was of primary and secondary school age. We collect data on the amount local, state, and federal governments spent on education at all levels as a percentage of GDP from Chantrill (2011a) for the UK, and To correct the probability of migrating to the US for potential migrant selectivity we rely on time-varying information on the number of immigrants who arrived in the US in the years each person was age 16-21 and 22-30. We obtain this information from the US Yearbooks of the 1 Among all British and German migrants in our sample, about 68% are married to US natives, 31% are married to compatriots, and less than 1% are married to migrants from other countries. 2 Ideally, one would like to use a more disaggregated measure of spending on educations, e.g. by level of education or geographic region/state. Long time-series on such disaggregated variables are not available. Snyder and Dillow (2011) provide separate data series on public and private education spending in the US by level of education from 1970 to 2010. Using those data we nd that the correlation between total private and public spending is 0.998, while the correlation between spending in primary/secondary schools and post-secondary institutions is 0.996. Immigration and Naturalization Service. We measure the average inow during late puberty and early adulthood because this is when people likely start to think about and potentially begin to form plans to migrate. We separate age-period 16-21 from age-period 22-30 because this is roughly when people make their education and labor market participation decisions, respectively.
We use ows rather than the stock of British immigrants in the US because we could nd no consistently dened time-series data that measures the stock.
To show how these data vary over time and age, we plot, in Finally, we include measures of the average per-capita GDP in the US, the UK, and Germany during the years each respondent was a child, a teenager, and young adult. Apart from predicting educational attainment, GDP is often used in the classic push-pull migration framework to control for the eect of economic development on an individual's decision to migrate. That approach posits that unfavorable (economic, political, and social) conditions in the home country push people to the host country, while favorable conditions in the host country pull people from their home country. We draw these data from Maddison (2006) .
Because in our analysis we pool data from repeated cross-sections from the host (US) and home countries (UK and Germany), we construct new sample weights so that our pooled samples are representative of the population in the host country in the year of the interview. We construct population weights with population data by year (of survey), age and sex from the the World Health Organization mortality database. 3 3 For each sex s, year t, and age-group k, we calculate population weights as:
(population stk /population st )/(sample size stk /sample size st ).
Empirical strategy
Let E * i be the latent variable that denotes the desired level of education of individual i. E * i is continuous but unobservable. We observe only the actual choice E i of the individual which is censored into C educational alternatives of increasing levels, with c ∈ {1, 2, ..., C}. The observed censored variable is a function of the latent variable, such that:
Using the values of E i we can dene marital mobility M i to equal 1 if a person's education is less than the education of his/her spouse and 0 otherwise. Formally, we set:
Our goal is to evaluate whether a person who migrated to the US and married a US native is more or less likely to experience marital mobility than a person who did not migrate and married another non-migrant. That is, we want to know whether P rob
To answer that question we model the joint probability of marrying and marrying a person with higher education, as follows:
where X denotes K exogenous variables; α are parameters to be estimated; and denotes a normally distributed error term. We estimate equation (2) by gender on the pooled sample of migrants in the host country and non-migrants in the home country by a standard probit regression. The value α 1 that we obtain is a`naive' estimate of the migration eect on mobility since it could be contaminated with two types of bias. Specically, the probability of marryingup may dier by migration status (i) if migrants select their spouses based on a dierent set of unobserved characteristics, or they have a dierent degree of marital selectivity, relative to non-migrants (dierential assortative mating bias); and (ii) if migrants self-select into migration based on unobserved characteristics that aect their choice of spouse or their own marital appeal (migration selection bias). To nd the causal eect of migration on marital mobility, we need to remove both types of bias.
The empirical literature that developed to test Becker's predictions on assortative mating typically estimates the degree of marital sorting using earnings regressions from samples of mar- All three countries we study here fall into this category.
We estimate the following model of demand for education:
where Y is the instrumental variable; θ denotes parameters to be estimated; and φ denotes a normally distributed error term. The estimated residuals of (3) embody traits that inuence not only the individual's potential for educational attainment but also his attractiveness to potential spouses. For example, a large positive residual may reect a range of traits that are visibly appealing such as exceptional ambition, mental health, condence, favorable socioeconomic family background, or the ability to contribute to home production (e.g. to raise and acculturate children). By contrast, the predicted values of (3) are purged from the eects of such traits. The predicted values rely on the variation of our instrument variable, which does not capture changes in educational attainment of either spouse which happened after marriage, and is not related to characteristics (other than education) that make an individual an appealing spouse.
Because E i has an ordered form and the error in the latent model is normally distributed, we can estimate the parameters by ordered probit. We run this regression on separate samples by country of residence at the survey year. We do not estimate this equation separately by sex or by immigrant status because we want to make sure that the resulting predicted values E i derive from the same distribution and can be compared across spouses. We use these values to dene a new measure of marital mobility:
We then re-model the joint probability of marrying and marrying a person with higher education using M i as the dependent variable, as follows:
As before, we estimate equation (5) by gender on the pooled sample of migrants and nonmigrants using probit regression. The value β 1 that we obtain is now net of marital selectivity eects, but it is still potentially contaminated with migration selection eects. Our last step is to address migrant selectivity by modeling the probability that a person migrates using the network of previous immigrants as an instrument that aects the migration decision but is orthogonal to marital mobility. 
This allows us to re-model the joint probability of marrying and marrying a person with higher education in two further ways:
Using bivariate probit, we estimate equations (6) and (7), and equations (6) and (8) Linear combinations of the coecients in equations (2), (5), (7) , and (8) provide estimates of the degree and the direction in which marital and migration selectivity change the causal eect of migration on marital mobility. Specically, dierences α 1 − β 1 and γ 1 − δ 1 approximate the marital selection eect, while dierences α 1 − γ 1 and β 1 − δ 1 approximate the migration selection 4 Alternative to using IV methods, one can also estimate our structural model with matching techniques. We decided against using matching because we had very few proxy variables available. To be appropriate for our empirical exercise, proxy variables should aect both the decision to migrate and the decision to marry a spouse of a given education level, but they should not be aected by the decision to migrate (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983) . Because migration likely aects many of the socioeconomic characteristics of individuals that are measured post-migration (e.g. household size, income), only a few of the available variables can serve as proxies; e.g., age and race. Relying on such proxies to carry out the matching estimation would likely violate a key aspect of the strong ignorability assumption; i.e., that, after controlling for the proxies, marital mobility should be independent of the selection into migration. We also prefer IV estimation over matching because, even when good proxies and good instruments are available, evidence suggests that the IV method outperforms the matching method (see, for example, McKenzie, Stillman, and Gibson 2010). eect. In both cases, the implied linear cross-model restriction is α 1 − β 1 − γ 1 + δ 1 = 0. To test this restriction, we re-estimate (2), (5), (6) and (7) , and (6) and (8) as a system of equations, where we combine the parameter estimates and associated (co)variance matrices into one parameter vector and one simultaneous (co)variance matrix.
Results

The migration eect on educational mobility through marriage
In Table 1 we showed that British and German migrants who marry US natives and live in the US are generally more educated than British and German natives who never migrate and marry non-migrants. Further, the US natives who are married to British and German migrants are also more educated than the British and German natives who never migrate. To further examine these patterns, in Table 2 we present indicators of assortative mating and marital mobility (M i ) by immigrant status and sex. The data show that the correlation of the educational attainment between spouses is highest for German natives (0.57), and in all other cases it is lower and roughly equivalent (about 0.39-0.46). However, women are more likely to marry more educated spouses than men are, irrespective of their migration status. Specically, the marital mobility rate for all migrant women and British native women is 37-40%, whereas the corresponding rate for all migrant men and British native men is only 22-26%. For German natives the mobility rates are relatively lower, consistent with the higher degree of assortative mating, but again women are more likely to marry more educated spouses than men are (with probabilities 0.24 and 0.20, respectively).
To what degree are the above patterns due to assortative mating? To answer this question we calculate new measures of assortative mating and marital mobility using the residuals and the predicted values from the probit estimates of equation (3) . We estimate this equation separately on the pooled CPS data of US natives and British and German immigrants, the BHPS data of British natives, and the SOEP data of German natives. Table 3 presents the results. In all samples, respondents attained more education if, during the years they were of school age, their government spent a larger share of GDP on education (holding GDP per capita constant). The estimated eect is higher in the UK than in Germany and the US. However, while in Germany and the UK spending when individuals were of primary-school age and spending in later years increase attained schooling by similar amounts, in the US only spending during primary-school age is important.
In Table 2 we correlate the residuals from these estimations between spouses and show that the correlation coecients are positive and sizable, suggesting the presence of positive assortative mating on the basis of education across all groups. We also present the estimates of marital mobility in the absence of assortative mating ( M i ). The data suggest that, if spouses had not selected each other on the basis of traits correlated to their educational attainment, then a larger share of migrant British men and women, native British men, and native German men, would have been married to more educated spouses. By contrast, a smaller proportion of native British women, migrant German men and women, and native German women would have been married to more educated spouses. Among all groups, non-migrant British and German men would be the most mobile through marriage, since 84 percent of them would marry a more educated spouse.
Migrant German men and non-migrant British and German women would be the least mobile through marriage, since only 13-14 percent of them would marry a more educated spouse.
These patterns suggest an important role for gender and migration in the determination of marital mobility. To obtain clearer evidence on this, in Table 4 we explicitly test whether and to what degree migration determines the marital mobility of British and German men and women.
Essentially, Table 4 presents probit estimates of equation (2) In the rst and third columns marital mobility is dened as M i (raw) and in the second and fourth columns it is dened as M i (estimated).
When we allow mobility to include the eect of marital sorting, we nd that German migrants are slightly more likely to marry up relative to their non-migrant counterparts, whereas British migrants are as likely to marry up as their non-migrant counterparts. When we purge out the marital sorting eect, we nd that irrespective of the country of migrant origin, migration is associated with lower marital mobility for men and higher marital mobility for women. In other words, there is something about the way migrants select their spouses that induces men to marry up and women to marry down. Had there been no marital sorting, migration would favor all migrant women relative to non-migrant women and it would disfavor all migrant men relative to non-migrant men. In fact, the size of this eect would be substantial. The results suggest that if all British men had stayed in the UK, then 85% of them would have been married to more Although the probit results are informative, it remains unclear whether the estimated migration eect on M i is due to the act of migration per se or whether it is because individuals who migrate dier in unobserved ways that aect their probability of marrying up. In Table 5 we attempt to disentangle these eects by instrumenting the migration decision using inows of British and German immigrants to the US during the time when individuals were forming their preferences about migration or they were forming the migration decision itself. More specically, Table 5 reports estimates of simultaneous equations (6) and (7) , and simultaneous equations (6) and (8) , by seemingly unrelated bivariate probit regression. As before, in the rst and third columns marital mobility is dened as M i and in the second and fourth columns it is dened as
The rst-stage regressions produce positive coecients on the instruments in both the British and the German samples. The likelihood that an individual migrates to the US increases with the mean annual inow of compatriot migrants to the US both over the time individuals were of age 16-21 and over the time they were 22-30 (though for German women inows over age [22] [23] [24] [25] [26] [27] [28] [29] [30] are statistically insignicant). Interestingly, for British women and German men the coecients on migration inows measured over the age of 16-21 are signicantly higher than those on inows measured over the age of 22-30, suggesting that these individuals form their preferences about migration at later ages than others. In all cases, the Wald test rejects the hypothesis that the migration decision is exogenous to marital mobility. The only exception to this is when we dene marital mobility as M i in the British sample, but in this case we also nd that the eect of migration on marital mobility is not statistically dierent than zero.
Interestingly, relying on exogenous variation in the migration decision does not signicantly aect the estimated eect of migration on marital mobility in the British sample. Not only are the migration coecients qualitatively robust across probit and bivariate probit models (Tables   4 and 5 ), but also the resulting marginal eects of migration on marital mobility remain very similar in scale. In contrast, instrumenting the migration decision does make a dierence in the results from the German sample. The implication is that the dierence between the naive and causal migration eects on marital mobility is driven mostly by marital selectivity in the British sample, and by both marital and migration selectivity in the German sample.
To facilitate comparison, Table 6 presents the estimated selection eects and tests of their statistical signicance. Marital selection eects are positive, sizeable, and statistically signicant for all migrant men, and negative but less sizeable and not always statistically signicant for migrant women. Migration selection eects are negative and statistically signicant for the Germans, but they are weak and of ambiguous signicance for the British. Specically, for British males (females) β 1 − δ 1 is positive (negative) and signicant, but α 1 − γ 1 is negative and insignicant. However, as for all other groups, the dierence between the two is statistically zero (the Wald test fails to reject the parameter restriction α 1 − β 1 − γ 1 + δ 1 =0 in all cases).
Discussion of the estimated eects
Our results suggest that, in the absence of spouse selectivity, migrant women are more likely to marry up relative to their non-migrant counterparts, whereas migrant men are more likely to marry down relative to their non-migrant counterparts. However, because of the way they select their spouses, migrant women reduce their probability of marrying up, while migrant men increase it. It follows that there is a component in the unobservables that drive marital selection that is sex and country-specic, such that it disfavors migrant women and it favors migrant men.
Although it could be one of many characteristics that t this prole, the ability to raise, educate, and acculturate children is plausibly country-and sex-specic and oers an explanation for our results. Becker argued that men specialize in market production and women specialize in home production. If market production is country-neutral but home production involves transmitting country-specic values to the ospring, then women are at a disadvantage in the US marriage market relative to their home marriage market. In this case, marital selectivity will cause migrant women to marry down relative to their non-migrant counterparts. Under the same rationale, men are equally competitive in the home and US marriage markets, but they value US wives less than native wives. In this case, marital selectivity will cause migrant men to marry up relative to their non-migrant counterparts.
The results also suggest that, in the absence of migration selectivity, both migrant women and migrant men are more likely to marry up relative to their non-migrant counterparts. However, because of the way they self-select into migration, migrant men and women reduce their probability of marrying up. This implies that unobserved characteristics that drive selection into migration (e.g. cultural characteristics, risk preferences, and language skills) make migrants willing to marry less educated US spouses in exchange for other favorable provisions. For example, US spouses may provide access to US residency and accelerate their assimilation in the US native community. Our nding that migration selection eects are weaker for British than for German migrants is consistent with this explanation. It is arguably more dicult for German migrants to assimilate in the US than it is for British migrants, since British immigrants are both culturally and linguistically more similar to US natives than German migrants.
These selection eects mask the causal eect of migration on marital mobility. After we purge out the selection eects, we nd that the causal eect of migration is positive for women and negative for men -a nding which, at rst sight, seems contrary to expectations. One would expect that the causal eect of migration would be positive for all migrants because mean educational attainment in the US has been consistently higher than in Germany and the UK over the period that the individuals in our sample were moving to the US and getting married.
We show this clearly in Figure 3 using data from Barro and Lee (2012) . The data suggest that, by moving to the US, all migrants got access to a marriage market where the average candidate spouse was more educated than in the home marriage market.
The gender dierence in our causal estimates can be explained if the gap in the timing of marriage between migrants and US natives is dierent across men and women. Because the surveys that we use for the analysis provide no information on the timing of marriage, we obtained relevant information from the US census (available at the international online database of Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS)). The 1980 wave of the US census reports data on the age at rst marriage and country of birth of each surveyed individual. Using this data, A further factor that would reinforce the disadvantage of immigrant men in the US marriage market is the possibility that they reach nancial maturity later than US native men. Considering that migration involves establishing a life in a new environment and competing in a new labor market where discrimination is potentially present, this is a reasonable possibility. If, in addition to getting married at older ages, single migrant men are less well-o relative to US natives, they are even less attractive as husbands to US native women. In contrast, the delay in nancial maturity is less of a problem for migrant women, as women are not typically expected to be the primary bread-winners of the household. Studies that examine the assimilation trajectories of immigrants in the US with respect to earnings provide supportive evidence. They show that, although immigrants eventually assimilate fully in the native population with respect to earnings, during their rst years in the US they suer a large earnings penalty relative to equally experienced natives. In fact, recent evidence from longitudinal data suggest that the immigrantnative earnings gap closes by half as fast as typical estimates from repeated cross sections suggest.
According to this evidence, it takes immigrants up to 20 years to make the same earnings as natives (Lubotsky 2007 ).
Tests of performance and robustness
Some aspects of our identication strategy potentially cause concern. One concern stems from the fact that migration inows are aggregations of individual behavior which (depending on the age each individual migrated) may include the migrants in our sample. Because of this, the predictive power of our instruments may reect exogenous correlated eects (Manski 1993 (Manski , 2000 . That is, it may reect that the migrants in our sample and the migrants in our instrument may decide to migrate because they have unobserved similar characteristics or because they are exposed to the same institutional or contextual factors (`Manski's reection problem'). To account for such unobserved common factors, we re-estimate our models using a xed eects specication.
Because our instruments vary by age and year of survey, we include a full set of age and surveyyear xed-eects. 5 We thus identify causality of the migration networks by using variation in the inows of migrants between age-groups within a survey year.
For completeness, we re-estimate both the probit and the bivariate probit models using the xed-eects specication. We present the new probit estimates in Table 7 and the new bivariate probit estimates in Table 8 . In all cases, the results remain qualitatively robust. Further, quantitative dierences concern mostly the instrument coecients and do not spill over to the estimated migration eects. The most notable dierence is in the German sample, where the coecients on migration inows become signicantly smaller. In contrast, for British men the coecients on migration inows measured over the age of 22-30 become three times higher. In all cases, the coecients on migration inows measured over the age of 22-30 become signicantly higher than those on inows measured over the age of 16-21, suggesting that individuals tend to form their preferences about migration mostly during young adulthood. On the whole, however, the inclusion of the xed eects does not alter the main patterns in the results.
6
A further source of concern is that the bivariate probit regressions provide no diagnostics for instrument performance. At times, economic studies that use bivariate probit obtain diagnostics from 2SLS estimates (see, for example, Evans and Schwab 1995). While the 2SLS estimation provides the opportunity to thoroughly test the validity and explanatory power of the instruments, it is not the appropriate method to use when the dependent variables are binary. The 5 See Nakajima (2007), and references therein, for a list of health economics studies that also treat Manski's reection problem with xed-eects. 6 The reason why we present the xed-eects specication as part of our robustness analysis and not as our main result is a practical one. The xed-eects specication causes separation problems so that the bivariate probit does not achieve convergence to a maximum likelihood. For this reason, to estimate the xed-eect specications in many cases we had to change the set of controls in our models (compare notes of Tables 4 and 8) . Importantly, in all cases, when we include xed-eects we are unable to jointly estimate equations (2), (5), (6) and (7) , and (6) and (8) , and thus to conduct the tests for the parameter restrictions. Similar problems with bivariate probit estimations have been reported by other researchers (e.g. Freedman and Sekhon 2010).
incorrect assumption of linearity for a relationship which is in fact non-linear will yield least squares estimates that have no known distributional properties (so that statistical inferences are unreliable), are sensitive to the range of the data, may grossly misestimate the magnitude of the true eects, and systematically produce probability predictions outside the 0-1 range. For these reasons, although we present 2SLS diagnostics, we do so with reservation.
To test that our instruments can be plausibly excluded as direct determinants of educational mobility through marriage, we calculate the Basman/Sargan X 2 statistic under the null that they are uncorrelated with the error term. To test whether our instruments have weak explanatory power, we calculate the F statistic under the null that the instruments are jointly statistically insignicant. Finally, we calculate the Wooldridge's robust score test under the null that the migration decision is exogenous to marital mobility, which is equivalent to the Wald test in the bivariate probit regression. Table 9 presents the instrument coecients from the rst-stage 2SLS estimates along with the diagnostic statistics. In all cases, the estimates are qualitatively robust in comparison to the ones produced by the bivariate probit and the diagnostic tests generally corroborate the good performance of the estimations. The Sargan test results indicate that the instruments are valid, the F-statistic is always statistically signicant (though low enough to suggest weak identication), and in most cases the Wooldridge test fails to reject exogeneity.
A number of patterns in these results add to our reservation about the linear probability model. First, the estimates suggest that if the mean annual inow of immigrants to the US increases by 10,000 during the youth of British and Germans, then the probability that they will migrate to the US increases by between 1.7 and 3 percentage points. Albeit plausible, these marginal eects appear suspiciously constant across samples. For example, the eects of the instruments appear to be equal in the samples of British women and German men. According to the bivariate probit estimates, however, these eects should be signicantly higher for German men than British women. The implication is that the least squares method fails to capture important non-linearities and, thus, underestimates the true eect of migration networks on the migration decision of German men. In turn, this also explains why the F-statistic appears weak.
Further inconsistencies between the linear and non-linear models appear in the results of the exogeneity test. Unlike the Wald test of the bivariate probit, the Wooldridge test produced after the 2SLS procedure fails to reject exogeneity of the migration decision in the sample of British men when mobility is measured as M i , even though the migration eect on marital mobility is statistically insignicant. An additional contradiction in the results of the two tests appears in the sample of German men (again when mobility is measured as M i ).
Conclusion
In this paper we have tested whether the decision of British and German individuals to migrate to the US and marry a US spouse provides them with better opportunities for educational mobility through marriage. Our analysis showcases that migration and marriage are jointly determined decisions which involve complex selection mechanisms. We show that, by migrating to the US, British and German migrants access a marriage market that oers more opportunities for educational mobility through marriage relative to their respective marriage markets in the home countries. However, this does not guarantee higher marital mobility rates for migrants relative to non-migrants.
A number of factors work against the positive prospects of the US marriage market. First, men cannot take advantage of the availability of more educated candidate wives in the US because they reach nancial maturity and they marry later than native US men, they miss the window of opportunity to catch the`good' spouses, and they end up with the`lemons'. Second, unobserved characteristics that drive marital sorting favor mobility for migrant men and disfavor mobility for migrant women -a result that can be explained if men specialize in market production which rewards country-neutral unobservables, while women specialize in home production which rewards country-specic unobservables (e.g. the ability to raise and acculturate children). Third, unobserved characteristics that drive selection into migration disfavor mobility for both migrant men and women, suggesting that immigrants may be willing to marry-down in order to marry-in.
That is, they may exchange education of their US spouses for other favorable provisions, such as help with assimilation in the US native community or access to US residence. The end-product of the above eects is that migrating to the US and marrying a US native pays o (in terms of educational mobility through marriage) for the Germans but not for the British.
. Notes: We have created ve aggregated educational categories using 13 categories from the BHPS, 16 categories from the CPS, and years of completed education from the SOEP, to avoid small sex-specic cell sizes. Notes: Controls are as in Table 4 . Huber/White standard errors are in brackets; probability values are in parentheses. 112.9 (0.001)*** (0.029)** (0.012)** (0.000)*** Notes: Controls are as in Table 9 . Huber/White standard errors are in brackets; probability values are in parentheses. Table 4 . Huber/White standard errors are in brackets; probability values are in parentheses. averaged over age [22] [23] [24] [25] [26] [27] [28] [29] [30] Inflows of German migrants to the US (in '0,000s) 
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